Russia in Global Affairs

What is more important for the global leader — the soft power of wealth or the hard power of the sword? Upholding the dominant global position with the power of sword flatters the ego of American power brokers but, from the financial perspective, this game might not be worth a candle.

In February 2022, many policy analysts, including this author, expected that the saber-rattling on both sides of the Russia-West geopolitical divide was simply a means to strengthen the bargaining position of both parties in the imminent forthcoming negotiations. History has proven that was not the case.

The political decision undertaken by the West to rebuff the Russian security demands of December 2021 was obviously debated and endorsed by at least some among the Western non-political elite. Who among them would benefit from the resulting strain of global chains that involved Russia and how?

The mainstream media describes the current clash between the collective West and Russia as a battle of good against evil; however, as it often happens in real life, good can effortlessly transform into evil and vice versa under the right circumstances.

The dramatic events that unfolded in the US capital in the beginning of January 2021 have added suspense to the narrative of tread towards the ‘new brave world.’ By and large the popular uprising in support of outgoing President Trump represents a finishing touch in setting the scene where the Covid-19 pandemic continued to form the background.

Today, as the world is feverishly looking for means to cope with the economic and social havoc caused by the coronavirus crisis, potentially more important, but barely noticed, processes have started around the globe. The germs for these processes were seeded when the powers fought valiantly the Great Recession 2008; that is, the germination took almost twelve years.

The end of the active stage of the crisis does not mean an automatic return to the old situation. We are likely to see a fundamental overhaul of the global economic system during the next few years. The role of the state as an initiator of development programs may grow to a level beyond which the free market idea may be invalid.

As Russia regained its power, inherent problems of conflicting interests and cultural incompatibility, which were temporarily hidden under the cover of Russia’s powerlessness, have come to the fore. The initial EU reaction to these new circumstances is to find ways to keep Russia at arm’s length, that is, to erect legal protective mechanisms along its eastern border.

Russia generates a weaker gravitational power than the top trade leaders but, nevertheless, it has sufficient “mass” to attract Eurasian states. Apart from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which definitely belong to its orbit, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan weakly gravitate toward Russia. In their turn, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are local centers of attraction for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively, while Ukraine is the local center for Moldova.